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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
TORTS-LIBEL-A CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE To MAKE NON-MALICIOUS
MISSTATEMENTS CONCERNING PARTICIPANTS IN PUBLIC DISCUSSION
Plaintiff, a Nobel Prize winning chemist, while appearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Internal Security, refused to
produce letters dealing with a nuclear test ban petition which he had sub-
mitted to the United Nations. Defendant published an editorial stating that
plaintiff had refused to testify and that he had been cited for contempt of
Congress. Plaintiff had not been so cited and sued for libel. From a verdict for
the defendant, plaintiff appealed. The court held that the rule announced in
New York Times v. Sullivan' allowing a privileged misstatement of fact con-
cerning public officials in the absence of proof of actual malice applies to
people such as plaintiff who project themselves into public discussion of matters
of pressing public concern. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362
F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. Week 3082 (U.S.
Sept. 13, 1966) (No. 522).
Before 1964, there were two points of view in American jurisdictions con-
cerning the libeling of public officials. The majority of states recognized a con-
ditional privilege to make fair comment or criticism of public officials so long
as these comments were not malicious. 2 Under the fair comment rule, malice
was defined as "personal spite or ill will, or culpable recklessness or negli-
gence."3 But the publisher was not privileged to make misstatements of fact
concerning public officials. The theory underlying the rule was that while it
was important for the public to have the opportunity to fully discuss the
qualifications and conduct of public officials, misstatements of fact were not
necessary to that end and allowance of such misstatements would drive able
men from seeking careers in government.4 A minority of states accorded a
conditional privilege to make misstatements of fact concerning public officials,
absent actual malice.5 Actual malice under the minority rule was defined as
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. E.g., Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 161 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1947) (applying
Florida law); Lubore v. Pittsburgh Courier Publ. Co., 101 F. Supp. 234 (D.D.C. 1951); West
Memphis News, Inc. v. Bond, 212 Ark. 514, 206 S.W.2d 449 (1947); Barwick v. Wind, 203
Ga. 827, 48 S.E.2d 523 (1948) ; Cook v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 559, 64
N.E.2d 751 (1945); Smith v. Pure Oil Co., 278 Ky. 430, 128 S.W.2d 931 (1939); Martin v.
Markley, 202 La. 291, 11 So. 2d 593 (1942); Kleinschmidt v. Bell, 353 Mo. 516, 183 S.W.2d
87 (1944); Rogers v. Courier Post Co., 2 N.J. 393, 66 A.2d 869 (1949); Rathkopf v. Walker,
190 Misc. 168, 73 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Murphy v. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union,
72 N.W.2d 636 (N.D. 1955); Thompson v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 325 P.2d 945 (Okla.
1958); Jackson v. Record Pubi. Co., 175 S.C. 211, 178 S.E. 833 (1935); Davila v. Caller
Times Pubi. Co., 311 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Owens v. Scott Publ. Co., 46 Wash.
2d 666, 284 P.2d 296 (1955); Annots., 110 A.L.R. 412 (1937), 150 A.L.R. 358 (1944).
3. Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N.Y. 95, 106, 172 N.E. 139, 142 (1930).
4. Post Pub1. Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, 540 (6th Cir. 1893), the leading case for the
fair comment rule.
5. Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Connor v. Timothy, 43 Ariz.
517, 33 P.2d 293 (1934); Snively v. Record Publ. Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921); Gough
v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho 502, 275 P.2d 663 (1954); Manasco v. Walley, 216 Miss.
614, 63 So. 2d 91 (1953); Williams v. Standard-Examiner Pub]. Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1
496
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publication of a fact with knowledge that it was false or without reasonable
grounds for belief in the truth thereof. 6 The minority jurisdictions reasoned
that the need for vigorous public discussion of public officers and candidates
for public office outweighed the possible risk to private character.
7
In 1964 the minority rule became the law of the land. The Supreme Court,
in New York Times v. Sullivan,s held that it was a violation of the first amend-
ment guarantees of free speech and press, made applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, to impose liability for misstatements of fact about
a public official acting in his public capacity, in the absence of actual malice.
The Court defined actual malice as the publication of factual misstatement
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether or not it
was true.0 The Court asserted that there is a profound national commitment
to robust and uninhibited debate on public issues and that fear of libel judg-
ments would cause inhibiting self-censorship. The Court further pointed out
that public officials are immune from liability if they defame someone within
the context of their duties, that citizens have a duty to criticize the govern-
ment, and that if the citizen were not given a privilege similar to that of
public officials, public officials would have an "unjustified preference" over
their constituents.10 The two concurring opinions in the Times case would have
made the right to criticize public officials absolute, not limiting that right by
allowing a public official to recover if he could prove actual malice.'1 In a later
case the Court applied the Times rule to prevent prosecution for criminal
libel of public officers without a showing of actual malice.' 2 In 1966 in Rosen-
blatt v. Baer'3 the Supreme Court reiterated its stand that the Times rule was
applicable only to public officials.
In Rosenblatt,14 the Supreme Court declared that the motivating force
in the Times decision was twofold---"first, a strong interest in debate on
public issues, and, second, a strong interest in debate about those persons who
are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues."' 5 The
Court went on to explain the rationale of the Times case:
(1933); Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943); Annots.,
110 A.L.R. 412 (1937), 150 A.L.R. 358 (1944).
6. Gough v. Tribune-journal Co., 75 Idaho 502, 275 P.2d 663, 667 (1954).
7. Coleman v. Maclennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908), leading case for the
minority view.
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9. Id. at 288. Note that the Supreme Court's requirement of reckless disregard was
somewhat more stringent than the reasonableness test applied by the minority states prior
to the Times case.
10. Id. at 282.
11. Id. at 293, 297.
12. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
13. 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (where the Supreme Court reversed a libel judgment for an
appointed supervisor of a public recreation area and remanded for determination as to whether
the plaintiff was a public official so as to come under the Times rule).
14. Ibid.
15. Id. at 85.
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Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing
attacks upon reputation. But in cases like the present, there is
tension between this interest and the values nurtured by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The thrust of New York Times is that
when interests in public discussion are particularly strong, as they
were in that case, the Constitution limits the protections afforded
by the law of defamation. Where a position in government has such
apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in
the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond
the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of
all government employees, both elements we identified in New York
Times are present and the New York Times malice standards apply.' 0
Thus, the Supreme Court viewed the problem as a delicate balancing of interests:
of the individual in a good reputation and of the public in uninhibited
debate. Federal and state courts quickly applied the Times decision to numerous
public officials,17 but one court refused to apply the rule to a case in which the
defamation of a public official was solely of his private character.' 8
Most of the federal and state courts which refused to apply the Times
rule to private individuals viewed the rule as applying only to public officials
and as being the result of the public official's privileged immunity against
liability for defamation. 19 But two courts refused to extend the Times rule
to private individuals who were participants in public discussion because it
was concluded that the equities weighed more heavily for the protection of
private reputation than public debate.20 Those decisions extending the rule to
16. Id. at 86.
17. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), (possibly applicable to appointed supervisor
of county recreation area); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (county attorney and
chief of police) ; Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909
(1966) (police lieutenant); Eadie v. Pole, 91 N.J. Super. 504, 221 A.2d 547 (1966) (city
assessor); Cabin v. Community Newspapers, Inc., 270 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (school
board member); Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc. 2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Clark
v. Allen, 415 Pa. 484, 204 A.2d 42 (1964) (U.S. Senator); McNabb v. Tennessean Newspapers,
Inc., 400 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. 1965) (member of Democratic primary board). The Times
rule was also applied to candidates for office: Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 A.C.A. 602, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 817 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Kramer v. Ferguson, 230 Cal. App. 2d 237, 41 Cal. Rptr.
61 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 A.D.2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (2d Dep't 1964),
aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 1023, 207 N.E.2d 260, 260 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1965); Driscoll v. Block, 3 Ohio
App. 2d 351, 210 N.E.2d 899 (1965).
18. Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1965). See also Butts v. Curtis Publ. Co.,
242 F. Supp. 390 (NJ). Ga. 1964), aff'd on other grounds, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965),
cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. Week 3124 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1966) (No. 37), where the court refused
to extend the Times rule to include a college athletic director merely because he was employed
at a state university.
19. Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188 (D.D.C. 1965); Fignole v. Curtis Publ.
Co., 247 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Lorillard v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 65 Ill. App. 2d
65, 213 N.E.2d 1 (1965) ; Powell v. Monitor Publ. Co., 217 A.2d 193 (N.H. 1966) ; Faulk v.
Aware, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 954, 202 N.E.2d 372, 253 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1964); Youssoupoff v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 48 Misc. 2d 700, 265 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1965);
Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Associated Press,
Inc., v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. Week 3124
(U.S. Oct. 11, 1966) (No. 150).
20. Afro-American Publ. Co. v. Jaffee, 33 U.S.L. Week 2634 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Harper
v. National Review, Inc., 33 U.S.L. Week 2341, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1964, p. 11, col. 2. (N.Y.
sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 24 A.D.2d 1085, 263 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1st Dep't 1965).
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include private individuals in public discussion found the opposite to be true.
2 '
In the instant case the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, per Judge
Blackmun, recognized the importance of the statements made by the Supreme
Court that there was a profound national commitment to robust and uninhibited
debate of public affairs and public officials. The court also took note of the
reservations in certain footnotes to the Times22 and Rosenblatt23 decisions (in
which the Supreme Court said it was making no decision whatever about possible
extensions of the Times rule). The court in the instant case noted possible argu-
ments against extension of the rule to private individuals, 24 but pointed out that
no reasonable distinction can be based on the premise that criticism of a private
individual who attempts to guide policy in public discussion will be less important
to the public interest than will criticism of public officials. In some cases, a private
individual may have more influence than some minor public official who is
clearly subject to the Times rule. Thus, such a person should be entitled to no
greater remedy than a person in public office. From the general thrust of the
Times and Rosenblatt decisions and in light of the footnotes therein, the
court in the instant case stated that the implications were clear that the Times
rule was applicable to some private individuals who took active part in public
debate. The court extensively chronicled Professor Pauling's past exploits and
concluded that he was in fact a person who had thrust himself into the "vortex
of the discussion of a question of pressing public concern" 25 and hence, under
the above reasoning, the Times rule should apply to him.
The reliance of the court in the instant case upon the notes in the Supreme
Court decisions seems misplaced. The court put primary emphasis on the
Rosenblatt footnote2 6 and apparently interpreted this note to be an indication
by the Supreme Court of the direction it would take if such a case (a person
thrusting himself into the vortex of public discussion) were properly before
21. Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 968 (1965); Walker v. Courier-journal & Louisville Times, 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D.
Ky. 1965); Walker v. Associated Press, Inc., 417 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1966); Pauling v. National
Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
22. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.23 (1964), at which the Supreme
Court said: "We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of
government employees the 'public official' designation would extend for purposes of this
rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not be included....
Nor need we here determine the boundaries of the 'official conduct' concept."
23. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n.12 (1966):
We are treating here only the element of public position, since that is all that has
been argued and briefed. We intimate no view whatever whether there are other
bases for applying the New York Times standards-for example, that in a particular
case the interests in reputation are relatively insubstantial, because the subject of
discussion has thrust himself into the vortex of the discussion of a question of
pressing public concern.
24. The court admitted that it is possible to say that while public interest requires
discussion of public officials, there is not a comparable need as to the qualifications of
private citizens in public life. Instant case at 196. The court also noted the unjustified
preference argument of the Supreme Court in the Times decision, but dismissed it as not
being a significant part of the rationale of Times. Ibid.
25. Instant case at 195.
26. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n.12 (1966).
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it. But the plaintiff in Rosenblatt was an appointive official and it was not
clear that the Times rule would apply to him. The Supreme Court, if it wished,
could easily have extended the Times rule to private individuals in that case by
looking past the technicality of the plaintiff's official position. Since the Court
did not make such an extension, it would seem reasonable to take the words
of the footnote merely to mean that the Court indeed was intimating no
view whatever on the matter.
In another footnote in Rosenblatt, the Supreme Court said that the public
interests protected by the Times rule are the interests in discussion, not re-
taliation,2 7 and from this the court in the instant case contended that the
unjustified preference argument was not a significant part of the Times ratio-
nale.28 In the Times decision, the Supreme Court pointed out that failure to
give private citizens a libel privilege similar to that of public officials would
give public officials an unjustified preference over the citizens they serve.20
It is submitted that by this the Supreme Court meant that the public official,
through use of his absolute privilege is able to increase his personal power
over the people and that the privilege of the Times decision was extended to
citizens so that they could keep a check on an illegitimate extension of that
power. This certainly does not seem to be an insignificant basis for the Times
rule.
It was correctly pointed out by the court in the instant case that some
people are able to guide public policy just as much, if not more, than public
officials and hence, they should have no greater remedy than men in public office.
But the court did not say that the rule would only be extended to people who
have this type of influence. Beyond saying that Pauling was in a position to
have "some influence"30 and that Pauling "obviously deemed himself influ-
ential,"3 1 the court failed to show that Pauling possessed influence equal to that
of a public official in guiding public policy. Further, the court did not make
clear whether the rule was being applied to Pauling because he had in the
past thrust himself into public discussion, or because of his present sub-
committee appearance, or a combination of both.
It has been pointed out that an irresponsible press with a privilege as
broad as that announced in the Times case is not likely to produce an in-
formed public, but rather will produce a misled or misinformed public.8 2 In
27. Id. at 84 n.10.
28. Instant case at 196.
29. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964), where the Court said:
Analogous considerations support the privilege for the citizen-critic of the govern-
ment. It is as much his duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer ....
As Madison said, . . . "The censorial power is in the people over the Government,
and not in the Government over the people." It would give public servants an
unjustified preference over the public they serve, if critics of official conduct did
not have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials themselves.
30. Instant case at 196.
31. Ibid.
32. Note, 51 Va. L. Rev. 106 (1965).
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addition, the extension of the Times decision may possibly have the effect
of restraining free debate, because private individuals will not be willing to
come into the public eye and to speak out for fear of being libeled in returfi.33
On the whole, it seems imprudent to extend the Times decision to all
private individuals who take part in public discussion. People tend to "take
with a grain of salt" defamatory statements about a public official, at least
more so than when the same things are said about private citizens. In addition,
it can be safely said that the responsible press will continue to attempt to print
only the truth, and thus the yellow press will be the only true beneficiary of
the extension of the rule by receiving a license to make character assassinations
almost with impunity. The fact that the defamed party may still sue for libel
if he can prove actual malice is of little protection since the decisions in this
area tend to show that actual malice is a fairly elusive thing to find and prove.34
As pointed out by Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in Rosenblatt:
[T]he preventive effect of liability for defamation serves an important
public purpose. For the rights and values of private personality far
transcend mere personal interests. Surely if the 1950's taught us
anything, they taught us that the poisonous atmosphere of the easy
lie can infect and degrade a whole society. 5
A few suggestions have been made regarding the problem of whether
or not to extend the Times rule to private individuals. One suggestion has
been to determine in each case whether or not there exists a legitimate public
interest in discussing the facts or events from which the alleged defamation
arose.30 Another suggestion has been enactment of a right of reply statute
under which the injured party would be able to have his side of the story
published in the offending publication. a7
It is the opinion of the writer that if any extension of the Times rule is
made to include private individuals, it should be along the lines which the court
seemed to develop in its reasoning in the instant case, but which it did not
express or apply precisely. That is, if the defendant wished to make use of
the Times rule as a defense against a plaintiff who was not a public official
he would have to show that the plaintiff had influence upon the formation of
33. Ibid.
34. In the instant case, defendant's only excuse for publishing the false statement was:
"We felt be was about to be cited, he wasn't." Id. at 198. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U,S. 254 (1964), failure to check newspaper's own files wherein lay the truth, held not to
be actual malice. Pauling v. National Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup.
Ct. 1966) (article mentioning plaintiff and others, asking if they were Communists and
saying that some undoubtedly were but the proof was not at hand to prove it in court, was
held not to constitute actual malice).
35. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 93 (1966).
36. Comment, 75 Yale LJ. 642 (1966); Bertelsman, Libel and Public Men, 52 A.B.
J. 657 (1966).
37. Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Transla-
lion, 49 Cornell L.Q. 581 (1964) ; for an excellent exposition of the right of reply see Don-
nelly, Thre Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 Va. L. Rev. 865
(1948). 1
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public policy at least equal to that of a public official, that the present event
was of public interest, and that the plaintiff had thrust himself into public
discussion of the issue. If any of these elements were not shown to be present,
the societal and individual interests in protection of reputation would out-
weigh the interests in public debate and plaintiff would be allowed to recover.
PETER J. BREVORICA
TORTS-LBEL---FALsE ANNOUNCEMENT OF BETROTHAL IS ACTIONABLE
PER SE WHERE TR PARTIEs ARE ALREADY MARRIED TO OTHERS
Defendant's newspaper published an announcement that plaintiffs Hinsdale
and Reiber had become engaged to be married. In fact, they were already mar-
ried to others, worked in the same office, and lived with their respective spouses
and children in the same small community in which defendant's newspaper was
published. Hinsdale and Reiber (joined by her husband) commenced actions in
libel against defendant. No special damages' were alleged in either complaint.
The Supreme Court in Special Term dismissed both complaints, holding that
an allegation of special damage is necessary where the publication is defamatory
only in view of extrinsic facts. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. 2
The Court of Appeals reversed. Held, where a publication falsely announces the
betrothal of persons in fact already married to others, that publication is action-
able without a showing of special damage albeit the facts making it defamatory
(i.e., that the parties are already married to others) do not appear therein. Hins-
dale v. Orange County Publications, Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 284, 217 N.E.2d 650, 270
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1966).
Libel has been described as writing that tends to hold plaintiff up to "ridi-
cule, contempt, shame, disgrace or obloquy, to degrade him in the estimation of
the community . . . to diminish his respectability .... ,, Where such a tendency
is apparent on the face of a writing, most courts agree that it is actionable per
se (i.e., without showing special damages).4 If the publication becomes defama-
tory only in light of extrinsic facts (i.e., facts not appearing in the publication
itself), it is generally accepted that such facts must be specifically alleged,
1. The term "special damage" refers to specific material or pecuniary damage that is
a natural but not necessary result of the wrong. Thus, injury to reputation, humiliation,
mental anguish, and physical sickness, are not sufficient. Special damages must be pleaded
with particularity. See McCormick, Damages §§ 8, 114, 115 (1935).
2. 24 A.D.2d 704, 261 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't 1965).
3. 1 Seelman, Libel and Slander in New York ff 18, at 16 (rev. ed. 1964), cited with
approval in Hinsdale v. Orange County PubI., Inc., 17 N.Y.2d at 287, 217 N.E.2d at
652, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 595 (1966) [hereinafter cited instant case].
4. The courts thus make a presumption that damage to reputation will inevitably re-
sult from the publication. See e.g., Boyd v. Boyd, 116 Va. 326, 82 S.E. 110 (1914). See also
Prosser, Torts § 107, at 780 (3d ed. 1964); 1 Seelman, op. cit supra note 3, 1 331, at 439
n.5 (compilation of New York cases so holding).
5. See Van Heusen v. Argenteau, 194 N.Y. 309, 87 N.E. 437 (1909); Lasky v. Kemp-
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